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Authored By: Devashish Bodhankar Citation - [(2021) SCC Online Del 2875] Date of Judgment – 07/04/2021 Bench - Honorable MR. Justice Vibhu Bakhru Court – High Court of Delhi Introduction The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has given many benefits for the new age companies because it provides the companies an efficient mechanism to get their disagreements settled outside the courts. It provides the companies an effective benefit that they can settle their matters in the Arbitration courts which do not involve any kind of judicial intervention. The concept of Arbitration arises when there are any contractual defaults between the parties, and only the parties to the contract can invoke the Arbitration clause. This brings us to the issue in the present case- Whether Non- Signatories of the contract be compelled to be part of proceedings of the Arbitration. However, in some exceptional circumstances, a non-signatory to the contract can also be compelled to arbitrate. Facts of the case In the present case, India bulls wanted to build a thermal power plant in the district Amravati of the state of Maharashtra. Therefore, to attain the same, India bulls called for tender on BTG works (Boiler Turbine Generator Package) which was also an important part of the thermal power plant project. In response to the tender, Shapoorji submitted their bid and ware awarded the tender. Thereafter Shapoorji entered into an agreement with a wholly-owned subsidiary of India bulls (Elena). Then Elena also issued a Letter of Acceptance with Shapoorji for civil construction and structural work in the project. Following this, India bulls gave several orders to Shapoorji. After some time a disagreement arose between both the parties regarding with the execution of the contracts, which is the main reason why Shapoorji invoked the clause of Arbitration. Though the petitioner (Shapoorji) invoked the clause of Arbitration, the respondents clearly denied the possibility of invoking the arbitration clause as they contended that they were never signatories to any contract or any contractual obligations of the BTG project with Shapoorji. They further contended that the contract was signed between two parties which were Shapoorji and Elena and they were never the signatories to the contract. As a result, the court tried to investigate nuances of this case to effectively determine whether the respondent, not being a signatory to the contract, could be made a party to the arbitration or not. Issue Involved Whether a party which is non-signatory to the contract could be compelled to arbitrate? Contentions by the Petitioner 1. The learned counsel for the petitioner contented that both the parties have agreed and acted in such a way that they had accepted the clause of Arbitration. Both the parties did not deny the fact that the arbitration should not be opted as a one-step method of resolving disputes. 2. The counsel for the petitioner further stated that it did not make commercial sense for both the parties that they have agreed to resolve disputes regarding the main contract with the arbitration and denied to include disputes regarding other contracts like supplemental and connected contracts. 3. The petitioner’s counsel further argued that the petitioners issued bank guarantees for the performance of the contract of BTG in favor of respondents not Elena and also the payments made to the petitioners are done directly by the India bulls, not Elena. Contentions by the Respondent 1. The counsel for the respondents argued that the India bulls was non-signatory to the contract of BTG and only Elena is a signatory to the BTG contract with Shapoorji therefore India Bulls could not be compelled to arbitrate. 2. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the notice invoked by the petitioners was a composite notice in respect of four contracts that are separate and don’t have any connection with each other and thus they are invalid (Lawyer Services ). Judgment The Court opined that in Chloro Controls (India) Ltd. vs. Severn Trent Water Purification[1], the Supreme Court referred to the Group of Companies doctrine and also applied it to compel certain parties to arbitrate in that case despite the fact that they are non-signatory to the contract. In Mahanagar Telephone Nagar Ltd. Vs. Canara Bank[2], the court decided that a Non-signatory affiliate of a parent company can arbitrate if there is a direct relationship between the parties, which is a signatory to the contract or the party which is not. In the present case, the High Court held that India bulls was a direct beneficiary under the contract of BTG with the Respondents because of the fact that they directly participated in the proceedings of the negotiation and the execution of the contract. India bulls had also insured itself against the performance of the contracts as well as it also paid Shapoorji directly. The court further stated that Elena which was a subsidiary of India bulls was also formed specifically by the India bulls to carry out the contract of BTD with Shapoorji. As a result of the High Court’s observations and evidence provided by the petitioner and also keeping in mind the doctrine of Lifting of the Corporate Veil, the court opined that the party compelling a non-signatory to participate in the proceedings of the Arbitration must show that the Non-Signatory is a direct beneficiary to the contract. The Delhi High Court observed that the India bulls was directly involved in the contract and was also beneficiary to the contract. The court further stated that the officials of India bulls which are acting on behalf of the Elena indicate that the India Bulls has direct control over all the affairs and operations of the Elena. Finally, the High Court of Delhi compelled India bulls to participate in proceedings of the Arbitration because Elena is it alter- ego of India bulls[3]. Case analysis In a ruling, the Supreme Court stated that the respondents failed to prove that they are non-beneficiaries to the contract hence they are compelled to participate in the Arbitration. The court went on to say that there must be some sufficient materials or doctrines to substantiate respondents as non-signatory to the contract before the court. Here, in this case, the petitioner had submitted several evidences to show that India bulls had actively participated in the contract. 1.Firstly India bulls (not Elena) itself invited tenders for the BTG contract, in respect of this Bid was submitted by the petitioners and then accepted by the respondents. This clearly states that are the India bulls had involved in the negotiation thus making it a party to it. The same has happened in the case of Gvozdenovic vs. United Air Lines[4]. 2.Secondly, the performance of the bank guarantees by Shapoorji towards the India bulls and issuance of Letter of Credit and certain payments by India bulls towards Shapoorji, concludes that they are beneficiary to the contract. 3.Thirdly, Clause 8 of the contract states that the petitioners had to get into a formal agreement with the respondents. In this clause, the name of Elena was mentioned in Parenthesis. The same has happened in the case of Furest Day Lawson Ltd. vs. Jindal Export Ltd[5]. From all the above-stated facts and the evidence, I am of the opinion that the petitioners were the direct beneficiary to the contract; therefore despite the fact that they are non-signatory to the contract, it can be made a party to the contract of BTG. Also, this case taught us that to prove a party as the beneficiary to the contract, the benefits they are getting should be a direct one and not an indirect benefit. Conclusion The High Court of Delhi gave its decision in favor of the petitioners. The Delhi High Court compelled the respondents to participate in the proceedings of the arbitration because the courts have sufficient material which proves that the respondents are the direct beneficiaries to the contract. Considering all the facts, precedents, evidence it was held that the India bulls was directly involved in the contract. It was also held that in any contracts whether it was main contract or supplemental and connected contracts, where the India bulls was directly involved and any dispute arises then that must be referred to the arbitration for the adjudication. Bibliography www.indianemployees.com www.Indiankanoon.com Motta, D. (2021). Can a Non-signatory but directly involved party to a contract be compelled to arbitrate? Indian Council of Arbitration, (ICAI) [1] 2006(3) BomCR 119 [2] CA 6202-6205 of 2019 [3] Avik Sarkar, Shapoorji and Co. vs. Rattan Power: Compelling Non-Signatory to Arbitration, www.allinidalegalforum.in [4] No. 1092, Docket 90-7886 [5] CA 3594 of 2001

Authored By: Kartikeya Nain Date of Judgement- 06th May, 2021 Court- Supreme Court Of India Bench- Justice D.Y Chandrachud, Justice M.R Shah Citation- SLP (C) No. 6731 of 2021 INTRODUCTION The Supreme Court of India in The Election Commission of India V. M.R.Vijayabhaskar saw that oral comments are not a piece of the authority legal record, and accordingly, the topic of canceling them doesn't emerge. It is prosaic to say that a proper assessment of a legal foundation is reflected through its decisions and orders, and not its oral perceptions during the consultation. Henceforth, taking into account the above conversation, we track down no substance in the petition of the EC for controlling the media from providing details regarding court procedures.[i] FACTS 1. A writ petition was filed by a member of Karur Legislative Assembly, Tamil Nadu Transport Minister MR Vijayabhaskar in the Madras High Court to guarantee that Covid-19 conventions are continued in the polling stalls in Karur Legislative Assembly Constituency of Tamil Nadu and that was acknowledged by the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.[ii] 2. The writ petition was heard by 2 Judge bench of the Madras High Court including Chief Justice of Madras High Court Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy and the order was passed on 26th April 2021. 3. During the time of hearing, thre bench of Judges made certain remarks targeting and alleging the election commission for the increasing number of Covid cases due to their inability to execute proper COVID-19 security measures and convention during the elections. 4. Despite the fact that the order was passed by the Madras High Court what chafed the political decision commission, The comments which were made by the appointed authorities and were brought up in the appeal are– “The solely responsible institution for 2nd wave of covid is the Election Commission” and “Election Commission should be charged for murder.”[iii] 5. However the above comments were made orally and this was not recorded in the request for the high court yet the media revealed the comments which stood out as truly newsworthy on paper, electronic and web-based media. This made the political decision commission record a unique leave request under the watchful eye of the Supreme Court of India that their various application was not evaluated dependent on merits and furthermore with respect to the oral perception and comments of the Madras High Court. ISSUE RAISED Whether the media should report the oral comments made during a judicial hearing? ARGUMENTS Contentions by Petitioner The counsel addressing the Election Commission argued that the comments and perceptions made by the high court judges are made without verification or material on record. These sorts of comments made by them have corrupted the picture of the political decision commission as it was generally revealed by the media. These comments can lessen the confidence of individuals in the political decision commission and further would bring up its protected power. Contentions by Respondent Addressing the respondent, the supporter restricting the entries fought by calling attention to the way that the Election Commission partakes in a wide scope of abilities during the time of races in a State like supplanting or suspending regional justices, cops, Director-General of Police and in any event, sending paramilitary powers to guarantee that the principles, rules or mandates are observed. Likewise, the political decision commission was answerable for the execution of security measures and Coronavirus conventions during races. JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court saw that oral comments made during any legal actions are never recorded as a component of the judgement. The court concurred that the comments made by the Madras High Court judges were cruel. It was said in the court that while making such 'seriouscomment" proclamations the appointed judges ought to control themselves in open courts. It was underlined that the language utilized by the appointed authorities while mentioning objective facts orally or in decisions ought to have legal respectability. The Supreme Court dismissed the prayer of the election commission to confine the media from revealing any oral comments made by the adjudicators as it strikes the major standards ensured under the Indian Constitution. Moreover, the adjudicators clarified that the idea of open court necessitates that the data with respect to the legal procedures in a court should be open to people in general and subsequently it ought to be made accessible in the public space. The court additionally took the case of print media detailing the preliminaries or court procedures during the British Raj like the rebellion preliminary of Lokmanya Tilak.[iv] The Supreme Court makes a decision about prompted that it would be better assuming the Constitutional Authorities acknowledge the new situation rather than whining. The court additionally adulated the High Courts for its estimable work during the Coronavirus emergency. ANALYSIS As properly said by the Supreme Court, an open court guarantees that the appointed authorities act in consonance with the law. The summit court incorporated the media announcing of official procedures under the essential right of the right to speak freely of discourse and articulation expressing that it is important for opportunity of the press. To preserve the democratic rule lifestyle it is fundamental that individuals ought to have the opportunity to communicate their sentiments and to spread the word about their perspectives for individuals at large. Freedom of the press isn't explicitly referenced in article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and what is referenced there is just freedom of speech and articulation. In the Constituent Assembly Debates, it was clarified by Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, that no extraordinary notice of the freedom of the press was essential by any means as the press and an individual or a resident were equivalent to far as their right of articulation was concerned. The political decision commission has a history of being an autonomous body thus it ought to keep up with being so. The main issue associated with the case was in regards to the power of an adjudicator to direct legal actions and to participate in an exchange over the span of a meeting and the opportunity of the media to report decisions yet in addition legal procedures or comments made during these procedures. CONCLUSION This judgement plays a very vital part in keeping the opportunity of media unblemished in detailing the court continuing. Right of media to Report Court Proceeding: Sine qua non for a sound Democracy. The media would have the right to report what all happens during a court continuing. However, the assessment of the court is constantly communicated through legal orders. The revealing of media is simply considered as detailing of court going before. The Supreme Court of India further stressed the requirement for judges to practice alert in the spur of the moment comments in open court, which might be helpless to error. This perception made in the said judgement likewise featured the need of judges to practice limits while mentioning any oral objective fact. Any way this judgement emphasizes the need for press opportunity for a sound and healthy democracy. REFERENCES [i] Election commission of India V. M.R Vijayabhaskar & Ors https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2021/11474/11474_2021_35_1502_27915_Judgement_06-May-2021.pdf [ii]https://thewire.in/law/why-media-cant-be-blamed-for-reporting-on-judicial-proceedings [iii] “The solely responsible institution for 2nd wave of covid is the Election Commission” and “Election Commission should be charged for murder.” https://www.livemint.com/news/india/madras-high-court-holds-ec-responsible-for-second-wave-of-covid-19-says-officials-should-be-booked-for-murder-11619427908292.html [iv]https://thewire.in/history/how-bal-gangadhar-tilaks-1897-trial-marked-the-criminalisation-of-dissent

Authored By: Rati Agrawal Citation: [2021 (5) KHC 443] Date of Judgement: September 6, 2021 Bench: Justice N Anil Kumar Court: High Court of Kerala "Even though he financed its construction, the Kerela High Court has held that a son-in-law has no legal title to his father-in-law’s structure." INTRODUCTION The Kerala High Court's Justice N Anil Kumar decided that sons-in-law had no legal claim to their father-in-law's property. Davis Raphel of Taliparamba, Kannur, appealed the Sub Court of Payyannur's decision dismissing his claim to his father-in-law Hendry Thomas' property. While rejecting the case, Justice N Anil Kumar issued the decision. The father-in-law filed a permanent injunction with the trial court, demanding that Davis refrain from trespassing on his property or interfering with his peaceful ownership and enjoyment of the property and house. Hendry claimed to have obtained the land through a donation agreement signed on behalf of and for St Paul's church in Thrichambaram by Fr. James Nasrath. He claims to have built a concrete house with his own money and that he and his family are presently residing there. His son-in-law, he maintained, had no legal title to the land. EXPLANATION The plaintiff (respondent herein) filed an original suit in the trial court seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant (his son-in-law) from trespassing into the plaint schedule property or interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property, which the plaintiff owns by virtue of a gift deed. The plaintiff's wife and daughter had also sought a restraining order against the defendant. Despite the fact that the cases had been settled, the defendant's behavior became unacceptable, causing the plaintiff to seek a permanent facially unconstitutional injunction barring him from entering the country. The defendant (appellant herein) stated that he had married the plaintiff's sole daughter and thus had been essentially adopted as a member of the family following the marriage, despite the fact that he had no legal title to the property. He claimed that he had a legal right to dwell in the property on these grounds. The trial court, on the other hand, found that the plaintiff is the owner and occupier of the plaint schedule property and that the plaintiff's son-in-law has no authority to interfere with the plaintiff's possession of the plaint schedule building. Despite the fact that an appeal had been filed, the first appellate court found that the defendant had no authority to interfere with the plaintiff's peaceful possession of the plaint schedule building. The appeal was dismissed as a consequence. The defendant, unhappy, files a routine second appeal with the High Court. The court's main concern was whether a son-in-law had any legal rights to his father-in-property laws and building. The plaintiff was paying property and building taxes, according to the court. He had also been residing in the plaint schedule building. It was also discovered that proving that the defendant is a family member proved challenging. The plaintiff's family, according to the court, consists of his wife and daughter. As a consequence, after the plaintiff gets possession of the property, the son-in-law cannot argue that he was adopted as a family member as a result of his marriage to the plaintiff's daughter and so has a title to the property. The court's main concern was whether a son-in-law had any legal rights over his father-in-property laws and structure. The plaintiff paid property and building taxes, according to the court. He, too, was a resident of the plaint schedule building. It was also discovered that establishing that the defendant is a family member is challenging. His wife and daughter, according to the court, make up the plaintiff's family. As a result, after the plaintiff obtains possession of the property, the son-in-law cannot argue that he was adopted as a member of the family as a result of his marriage to the plaintiff's daughter and so has a title to the property. The son-in-residence law is in the plaint schedule building if it is just permissive in character, it was reaffirmed. As a consequence, even though he paid for the building's construction, the court held that the son-in-law had no legal title to his father-in-law’s building. PRECEDENT MENTIONED CASE LAW Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C.Alexander and others [AIR 1968 SC 1165] In this case, The Supreme Court's Three-Judge Bench reaffirmed the notion that possession is valid against anyone to save the genuine owner. A person in possession of land in the supposed character of the owner and exercising peaceably the regular rights of ownership has a perfectly valid title against everyone save the genuine owner, according to the dicta given out in the aforementioned case. The legitimate owner filed an injunction against him, preventing him from entering the land. The defendant's residency in the plaint schedule building, if any, is purely permitted in character. The defendant cannot claim that he is the lawful owner of the suit property or the structure. As previously stated, both courts below have presented compelling reasons for concluding that the plaintiff's injunction complaint was maintainable without further relief. A plaintiff is a man of terrible character, according to learned counsel for the appellant, and he does not get along with his family members. A fact about an individual's character is not relevant in civil disputes, according to Section 52 of the Indian Evidence Act . It establishes the notion that a party's character cannot be used as evidence to show that the action ascribed to him is neither likely nor improbable. The irrelevance stems from the fact that a civil action must be determined on the merits of the dispute between the parties, not on the parties' current or former character. On behalf of the respondent, it has been adamantly argued that there was no issue of law in this appeal, much less any serious matter of law sufficient to warrant interference in the second appeal. In a second appeal, the same results are being challenged. To be a question of law in a case, there must first be a foundation for it laid out in the pleadings, and the question must arise from credible findings of fact reached by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to resolve that question of law in order to reach a just and proper conclusion to the case. CONCLUSION Even if the assessment of evidence is inaccurate and the finding of fact is incorrect, a concurrent finding of fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property on the date of the action is not subject to dispute in the second appeal. As a result, this Second Appeal may be rejected. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no error in the first appeal court's judgement upholding the trial court's judgement and decree by decreeing the complaint about injunction simpliciter. As a result, this RSA is rejected without prejudice. If there are any pending applications, they will be closed. REFERENCES 1. KUMAR, A., 2021. Son-in-Law Has no Legal Right in Father-In-Law's Property: Kerala High Court [READ JUDGEMENT]. [online] Lawstreet.co. Available at: [Accessed 23 December 2021]. 2. HIDAYATULLAH, M., n.d. Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs Rev. Father K. C. Alexander & Ors.. [online] Legal Authority. Available at: [Accessed 23 December 2021]

Authored By: Niket Aman Citation: MANU/SC/0361/2021 [Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010] Date of Judgement: 28 May 2021 Division Bench: C.J.I. N.V. Ramana, and Justice Aniruddha Bose. Court: Supreme Court of India Introduction: Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana is a landmark judgment on Dowry Death. Dowry is the most immoral and sinful thing that leads to Dowry Death. Section 304 B has been commenced by the Parliament to restrain the facts of dowry death. This section deals with the essence of dowry death and also provides an escape clause by saying “soon before”. So, the accused has to prove beyond reasonable doubt for his innocence. The courts have to follow the principle of Audi Alteram Partem-natural justice, which compels the court to hear the accused fairly and to get his response. Facts: On July 31st, 1995, the prosecution has filed a case under sections 304 B and 306 of Indian Penal Code,1860 by the father of the deceased against the husband and his family [Accused]. The deceased is the wife of Satbir Singh, who has died due to burn injuries. The prosecution side has also claimed that this is a suicide case under section 306 Indian Penal Code. These things started when she is unable to get enough dowry from her parents and her in-law’s house is demanding more dowry, as she is unable to fulfill their needs then she has to suffer from harassment, cruelty, and abuse from them just before her death. After further investigation and autopsy it has been found out that the body has been covered in Kerosene and only 15% of the body remains to identify other than 15%, the body has been destroyed and cannot be identified. When the case went to Trial Court the court sentenced the accused under sections 304 B and 306 of Indian penal Code, they went to High Court and the court in his discretion upheld the judgment of the Trial Court of Haryana and Punjab and dismissed the appeal on November 11, 2008. The decision that has been passed by the trial Court and High Court, is not based on factual evidence, it is basically based on the assumption. The prosecution is unable to give conclusive evidence to prove that the deceased has committed suicide. So, the court finding under section 306 is not maintainable. Key Contentions/ Issue Raised: After hearing the argument from both the parties, there are two issues raised: I. Whether the Trial Court, and High Court was correct in convicting the accused on the charge Under Section 304B, Indian Penal Code? II. Whether the Trial Court and High Court, was correct in convicting the accused on the charge Under Section 306, Indian Penal Code? Arguments: 1. Argument presented by the Appellant: According to the appellant counsel, the prosecution side has not been able to prove that the dowry has been demanded and by the fact it could be a suicide. The appellant side argued that accidental fire has not been excluded in this case. That means there the court could be in their opinion that this could be an accidental fire. As the demand has not been proved by the prosecution, immediately before the death of the victim. 2. Argument presented by the Respondent: According to the prosecution counsel, the deceased has been died within 1 year of her marriage by ablaze his body. Many people have been stating that the accused family has been demanding dowry multiple times and have seen them treating not her in a good manner. The appellant has not been able to provide the correct fact that why the apex court should interfere with the judgment given by Trial Court and High Court. Judgment: The judgment is based on section 304B of Indian Penal Code, and the essential factors to prove that there is a dowry death, the court is looking into Major Singh vs. State of Punjab. In which it has been stated that, if within 7 years of the marriage the woman is suffering from cruelty and harassment for dowry, in her in law’s house and by that she is died due to burn injuries and this all happens soon before the women’s death, then it will come under section 304B of Indian Penal Code. But the court has to see through all the factors that “soon before” does not mean immediate before, it has to be determined by the court, there is no straight jacket for it. Between the death of the victim and cruelty or harassment, the court has to be cautious to find out whether cruelty or harassment has happened soon before the death of the victim or not. To determine the dowry death the link should be established between them. The court has to take into consideration that if the dowry has been demanded and cruelty and harassment took place immediately before her death, then it is mandatory to it into consideration. The prosecution, defense, and judges have the greater responsibility as there is a presumption against the accused. So, the judge should have heard the accused side under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 very carefully and not just a formality. It creates a responsibility on the Court to question the accused and hear what he says, hearing should be fair and with awareness. The Court should provide the material relating to the case and it should be incriminating and to see the response of the accused. The defense counsel should prepare the defense as it is the responsibility on their side to prepare against the prosecution under section 304B of IPC that reads with section 113B of Indian Evidence Act. After hearing the argument on both sides, if the court found out the evidence that has been presented by the prosecution and inspecting the accused, the judge should take the statement in written and after all this, the judge is not satisfied by the prosecution then the court can pass the judgment of acquittal under section 232 of Code of Criminal Procedure. In another situation, if the accused is not acquitted, then the accused is to present his defense under section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts under section 304B of Indian Penal Code should not be considered as a straightforward approach in determining there is a homicide, accident, or suicide. This type of consideration happens due to the fact that the death other than the natural circumstance could be suicide, homicide, or accident. Another issue is related to section 306 of Indian Penal Code, it is only in existence when the prosecution is able to prove abetment to suicide. To convict someone in this section, first, it has to prove that there is a suicide had taken place. Precedent Mentioned (Case Laws): · Major Singh v. State of Punjab · Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company · Kans Raj v. State of Punjab · Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab · Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana · Maya Devi v. State of Haryana · Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana Case Analysis: The apex court in his judgment noted that the Trial Court and High Court have given the judgment under section 304B and 306 of Indian Penal Code, which deals with dowry death and abetment of suicide. The court took the case of Major Singh v. State of Punjab into its consideration the necessary ingredients to convict someone under a dowry death case. The court also tells that there should have a liberal approach in the term of soon before as it is a loophole. And if it does not see it in a liberal form then there could be so many ambiguities and it will be hard to follow this section. The Court after knowing the importance of this section explains the idea of ‘soon before’ in the common and understandable sense as if it has been explained in a harsh manner then the main essence of this section would have been lost. There should be a link established between harassment and the death of the victim, as soon before does not mean immediately before, but there is a causal link in it. In the cases of dowry death, the apex court gave the guidelines regarding examining the accused, it should be the court’s responsibility to take the statement of the accused as it is on the accused to prove his innocence. A speedy trial should be used in these types of cases, as it is of grave importance as the speedy trial will lead to come to the verdict in time, and the trial court should hear both parties fairly. It has also been held by the court that under section 304B of Indian Penal Code, which deals with death under abnormal circumstances for dowry death. The apex court in his judgment dismiss the prosecution claim under section 306 of Indian Penal Code, as the prosecution is failed to provide conclusive evidence to prove the same. It is only when the prosecution is able to provide the evidence regarding the suicide of the deceased only then it is to be assumed that the husband and his family are involved in the suicide. The decision is given by the divisional bench on the basis of the facts and figures that have been provided in front of them. Both the judges have taken into consideration the evidence by the prosecution in connection with the death of the victim. Is this the evidence that satisfies the court to take such steps. Conclusion: The burn injuries satisfy the prosecution claims, as it happens with the one year of the marriage, in considering with the demand of dowry, it also has been proven that there are so many circumstances in which the deceased has to suffer from harassment and cruelty by their in-laws. It is in the discretion of the court, that how they are going to consider soon before in section 304B of Indian Penal Code. The court found out that the evidence provided under section 304B of Indian Penal Code, is correct regarding convicting the accused and it is relevant to the case. While on the other hand the prosecution is not been able to provide conclusive to convict the accused under section 306 of Indian Penal Code, as it has not been proven that this is a suicide case and if this is not a suicide case then it surely doesn’t come under this section. That’s why the court convicted the accused under section 304B of Indian Penal Code and not under section 306 of Indian Penal Code. References/ Bibliography: 1. Satbir Singh v State of Haryana, 2021 MANU/SC/0361/2021, manupatra - Your Guide to Indian Law and Business and Policy (manupatrafast.com) (Accessed 20 December) 2. After one year of marriage, a woman burnt to death over dowry. Supreme Court finds accused guilty; explains the true import of “soon before” under section 304-B IPC https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/05/29/after-one-year-of-marriage-woman-burnt-to-death-over-dowry-supreme-court-finds-accused-guilty-explains-the-true-import-of-soon-before-under-section-304-ipc/ (Accessed 21 December) 3. https://www.soolegal.com/rc/satbir-singh-v-state-of-haryana (Accessed 21 December)

Authored by: Joseph Punnen Date of Judgement: 20 October, 2021 Bench: A full judge bench led by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud Court: Supreme Court of India Citation: Criminal Appeal No 1165 of 2021 Brief overview of the case: The appellant of the case had filed a petition before the High Court of Bombay to challenge the order declared by the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ), Nanded. The case was taken up to the Supreme Court to hear the two appeals which arose from a judgement dated 5 July 2018 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Background of the case: In the subsequent case of Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai vs. Council vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., the respondent was Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai who was registered under Sections 120-B and 471 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 read with Sections 13, 16, 18, 18-B, 20, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 19673 and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908. The case was registered against two persons, (i) Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai (the appellant) and (ii) Farooq (who’s currently residing in Syria). The case was based on the fact that Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai was in contact with the members of the Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ Islamic State of Iraq and Levant/Daesh through internet and these are banned organizations deemed by the United Nations as well as the Indian Government. It was alleged that the appellant was planning to assist Farooq in constructing a bomb/IEDs which would be later used to blast during the month of Ramzan. The Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) has arrested four people, namely (i) Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai; (ii) Mohammad Shahed Khan; (iii) Iqbal Ahmed; and (iv) Mohammad Raisuddin for their alleged links. The Government of Maharashtra designated the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nanded as a Court of remand and the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded as a Special Court to try the cases. Seeing the gravity of the case, the Central Government has directed the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to take over the case, under Section 6(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act 2008 on 8 September 2016. However, ATS Nanded has continued their investigation and has filed further actions against the accused under the UAPA, and ATS Nanded handed over the case to the NIA on 8 December 2016. This has prompted the prime accused Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai filed an application before ASJ Nanded, stating that the offences carried out against him are under the UAPA which is under the NIA Act (2008), and therefore the CJM, Nanded had no jurisdiction in this regard, and he further went on to say that ASJ, Nanded was not a “Court” as established under the Sections 11 or 22 of the NIA Act (2008). His application was struck down by ASJ, Nanded and he further filed for a criminal writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay to challenge the order of the ASJ, Nanded and the Court has dismissed his petition. Thus, the case was taken up by the Supreme Court to clear the brevity regarding it. Issues: 1) Whether “Special Court” as mentioned in Section 2(h) of the NIA Act (2008), means a Special Court as stated under Section 11 of the NIA Act (2008). 2) When the Union Government has asked the NIA to take over, doesn’t the jurisdiction of ATS Nanded end 3) Since the FIR was re-numbered by the NIA Mumbai on 14 September 2016, ATS Nanded continued to do the investigation 4) As all offences are punishable under the UAPA, and are considered as scheduled offences under the NIA Act (2008), thus CJM Nanded is divested of their jurisdiction Arguments: Following are the contentions made by both parties: Contention on behalf of respondent- 1.The respondent has stated that, till the NIA takes up the case, it would be the duty of the investigating officer to continue with the investigation according to the Sub-Section (7) of Section 6 of the NIA Act (2008). 2.The respondent has also argued that based on Section 13 of the NIA Act (2008), every scheduled offence which is investigated by the “Agency”, would be tried by the Special Court within the local jurisdiction. As states in Section 2(a), the “Agency” refers to the NIA, and as a result there won’t be any limits to any Court until the s the scheduled offence is investigated by the NIA. Contention on behalf of Appellant- 1.The appellant questions the term of “Special Court” and calls for a clear-cut clarity before giving out the judgements. 2.Upon the issuance of direction from the Union Government under sub- Section (4) or sub-Section (5) of Section 6, neither the State Government nor the Investigating Police Officer can continue with the investigation. It must be transferred to the NIA. 3.The appellant contents that, despite the order under Section 6(4), the ATS Nanded continued with their investigation and filed a case in breach of the provisions of sub-Section (6) of Section 6. 4.Since the UAPA comes under the NIA Act (2008) as a scheduled offence, it would be outside the jurisdiction of the CJM, Nanded. Explanation There appears a controversy regarding the interpretation of Section 6 of the NIA Act (2008). Upon careful scrutiny of the entire Act, it can be observed that, upon the instruction from the central government, the state government as well as the investigating police officer are not to proceed with the investigation and their duty is to transfer the entire documents and records to the NIA. Moreover, it is the duty of the investigating officer to continue with the investigation till the NIA takes up the case based on Section 6(7). Until the NIA takes up, the state government has power to investigate and prosecute any scheduled offences. Verdict The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the orders passed by the High Court on 5 July 2018, and affirmed that with Section 6(7), the ATS Nanded was allowed to continue its investigation until the NIA Mumbai actually took up the investigation.

Authored By: Vaishnavi L Date of judgement: 24 September, 2021 Bench: Justice P V Kunhikrishnan Court: High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam Citation: WP (C) No. 18776 of 2021 Overview of case: The Kerala High Court opined that ‘swap transplants’[1] will be permissible even if each donor-recipient pair are not immediate relatives, provided there subsists a special reason for the donor to donate an organ like affection, fondness and attachment. The court mean is to allow the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act of 1994 turn into a path breaker for communal harmony and secularism so that people of different faiths and criminal backgrounds can donate their organs to the needy notwithstanding of caste, creed, religion or criminal antecedents. Counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that the authorization committee repudiate both sets of applications holding that the petitioners do not come under the purview of ‘near relative’. Background of case: Moideenkutty, Malappuram, Jameela Saleem, Kannur, and Ummer Farooque KP filed the writ petition under Article 226 and Article 227 challenging the order of the Transplantation of Human Organs declining the plea for swap transplantation. Moideenkutty and Saleem are kidney patients. Jameela Saleem the wife of Saleem and Ummer Farooque the father-in-law of the son of Moideenkutty are ready to donate their kidneys. Arguments: · Contention by Petitioner The counsel representing the petitioner, TP Sajid and Shifa Latheef pointed out that the authorization committee rejected both sets of applications holding that the petitioners do not come under the purview of ‘near relative’ as per the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act. The argument of counsel is that they require urgent kidney transplantation and rejection of their application would cause offense to their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. · Contention by Respondent Princy Xavier, the government pleader argued that despite the fact that Jameela Saleem, being the wife of Saleem, would be a near relative, Ummer Farooque cannot be treated as a near relatives as defined under the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act. Explanation: The judgement came on the plea of a man, whose both kidneys have flopped, challenging the committee’s 8th July evaluation disallowing the application for enabling his former driver organs, with whom he has a close association, to donate one of his kidneys to him. The District Level Authorization Committee submitted that a person willing to donate his kidney to destitute patient could not do so, as he was involved in multiple criminal incidents. Deprecating the committee’s decision, the HC said the criminal antecedents of a donor was not a yardstick to be considered by the panel as per the provisions of the aforesaid act or the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Rules of 2014 framed under it. If the perception of the committee was accepted, the only potential deduction was that it believed that the criminal behavior of the donor would percolate to the persons who received the organs. No person who received with common sense could agree with these sturdy reasons given by the committee. The court said that, “There is no organ in the human body like a criminal kidney or criminal liver or criminal heart! There is no difference between the organ of a person without a criminal antecedent and the organ of a person who has no criminal antecedents. Human blood is passing through all of us”. Further it observed, “if a person dies, he will be buried and he will rot. If person is cremated, he will become ash, but if the organs of his body are donated, he will give life and happiness to many.” It added that, “I apprehend that, the respondent (committee) will reject such applications for permission to donate organs even on the ground that the donor is a murderer, thief, rapist, or involved in minor criminal offences. I hope, they will not reject the applications because the donor is a Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Sikh or person in a lower caste after comparing with the religion and caste of the recipient.” The court opined if there was no trace to substantiate that shows there is no commercial dealing, “pragmatism should overtake technicalities, because a person is on bereavement. The decisions of the authorization committee should encourage the people to donate their organs to needy people. Awareness is necessary to increase the organ donation ratio in India. Some studies on the internet show that India remains a country with one of the lowest organ donation rates in the world.” “In exigent cases, the concerned authority ought to convene the meeting and consider the applications forthwith, it further said that a time limit was necessary for convening the meeting also and if there was any delay of more than one week for convening a meeting from the date of receipt of the application by the committee, it should mention the reason for delay in the order.” The court intended the committee to go back over the petitioner’s plea within seven working days. Verdict: The observation by Justice P V Kunhikrishnan came while setting aside the decision of the Ernakulam District Level Authorization Committee for Transplantation of Human Organ donation on the ground that the donor had criminal antecedents, “the court decided in the favor of the petitioners and directed the respondents to consider the application.” The court observed that the Act envisages non-relative organ transplantation and the condition is that the donor should have a special reason for giving an endorsement for transplantation and prior approval should be obtained from the authorization committee. The prime purpose of the enactment is facilitating the transplantation of human organs for the therapeutic purposes. When section 9(3)[2] permits transplant of organs to person not being a near relative, with the prior approval of the authorization committee, there is no logic or rationale to say that swap transactions will not be allowed when members of each pair are not near relatives, even if the authorization committee approves such transactions. The court directed the committee to consider the applications of the petitioners and approve the same immediately without any further postponement. The chief secretary was directed by court to issue all the obligatory orders and generate a copy of the same acknowledgement before the Registrar General of the high court within a month from the date of receipt of a counterfeit of the judgement. References: 1.Pratap Giti, “Kerala High court permits organ-swap among non-near relatives, calls for changes to Transplantation of Human Organs Act” 2.Varghese M H, “Swap Transplantation Permissible Even If donor-Recipients Not Near Relatives, Provided Special Reason Exist For Donation: Kerala High Court” 3.Indian Express, “Swap transplants permissible even if each donor-recipient pair not near relatives, says HC” 4.Shroff Sunil, “Legal and ethical aspects of organ donation and transplantation” 5.The Indian Express, Philip Shaju, “Nothing like criminal kidney: Kerala HC sets aside authorization panel’s decision” 6.The Economics Time, “Let organ donation law become path breaker for communal harmony: Kerala High Court” 7.The Hindu, “There is no Criminal organ in human body: Kerala High Court body” 8.Indiankanoon, “Moideenkutty v The District Level Authorization” [1] A paired kidney exchange, also known as a kidney swap occurs when a living kidney donor is incompatible with the recipient, and exchanges kidneys with another donor/recipient pair. [2] No human organ removed from the body of a donor before his death shall be transplanted into a recipient unless the donor is a near relative of the recipient.

Authored By: Arya Asolkar Case name: State of Chhattisgarh and Anr. v. M/S Sal Udyog Private Limited[1] Date of Judgement: 8th November 2021 Coram of Judges: 3-judge bench Chief Justice of India N.V Ramana, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Hima Kohli Court: Supreme Court of India Case description: In this case, the Supreme Court held that a party is not barred from raising an additional ground for setting aside an arbitration award in an arbitration appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996, just because that ground was not raised in the petition under Section 34 to set aside the arbitration award[2]. Facts of the case: 1.The company had made a deal with the state of Madhya Pradesh to make the delivery of Sal seeds. Later, the government passed legislation nullifying all forest product agreements due to loss of revenue. The respondent, enraged by the termination caused by State of Madhya Pradesh, initiated Arbitration Proceedings against the state government, requesting, among other things, a return of certain amounts. 2.The solitary arbitrator issued an arbitral decision in favor of the respondent's reimbursement claim (including interest at 18 per cent per year). The appellant, who was dissatisfied with the decision, filed a case with the District Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 3.However, the appellant's requests for relief were denied, and they filed an appeal with the Chhattisgarh High Court against the learned District Judge's judgement under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The appellant presented a new ground (which was not brought before the District Court) in the stated appeal, namely, the non-requirement of a refund of "supervision charges," based on the provisions of the underlying agreement, which the Arbitrator did not consider while giving the Award. 4.The High Court issued an order on 21st October 2009 that merely changed the interest rate from 18% to 9% and dismissed the remainder of the appeal. The respondent, dissatisfied with the ruling, filed a second appeal with the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Issues in question: 1.Whether the High Court was correct in declining to exercise its jurisdiction to set aside the award merely because the said ground was not raised before the District Judge? 2.Whether the appellant can introduce an additional issue in an arbitration appeal relating to the refund of "Supervision Charges" even though it was not stated in the petition? Contentions: ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY APPELLANT: 1.Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel for the appellant stated that it may be deduced from the Agreement that the parties agreed that the State Government's expenditures for delivering Sal seeds to the respondent-Company would include handling and supervision charges each year. 2.She claimed that the Award's patent illegality was underlined in reasons (J) and (K) of the appeal filed under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, as well as in para 3 of the impugned judgement, but the High Court failed to reach a decision. 3.There was no justification for the learned Sole Arbitrator to deduct 'supervision charges' and direct repayment to the respondent-Company since the Company had neglected to make any objection to their levy throughout the years and had paid the stated sum without complaint until the contract's termination. 4.The counsel cited Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.[3] to support the proposition that patent illegality is a legitimate reason for appealing a domestic award. ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY RESPONDENT: 1.Mr. Pranav Malhotra, learned counsel for the respondent, argued that because the appellant-State did not raise any dispute towards the deduction of "supervision charges" in its Section 34 petition, it must be assumed that it rescinded its right to raise such an objection in the Section 37 petition filed in the High Court, and for that matter, before this Court. State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited[4] was cited to substantiate such an objection. 2.To address the aforementioned objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant-State did not take a specific ground in the Section 34 petition on the aspect of refund of 'supervision charges,' the counsel relied on the judgement in Lion Engineering Consultants v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others[5]. Observations by Court: 1.The 1996 Act's law on intervention in issues of awards was narrowed with the goal of limiting judicial interference in arbitration cases; this may be deduced from the findings in Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)[6] 2."Patent illegality" is one of the reasons for setting aside an Award. The court observed that the grounds raised would meet the requirement of patent illegality that is manifest on the face of the Arbitral Award. 3.The court dismissed the company's argument that because the state did not make such an issue in the Section 34 petition's arguments, it is estopped from doing so in the appeal filed under Section 37 or before this Court. The court further stated that the Company's reliance on the judgement in the Hindustan Construction Company Limited[7] case was misguided. 4.The Court concluded that the learned Sole Arbitrator's failure to decide in accordance with the terms of the parties' contract would certainly attract the "patent illegality ground," as the omission amounts to a gross violation of Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act, which requires the Arbitral Tribunal to consider the contract terms when making an Award. Decision and Conclusion: To pass the Arbitration Award while ignoring the implication of terms in the underlying agreement governing supervision charges was seen as a patent illegality by the Apex Court in the instant case. As a result, the Court emphasized that Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act is consistent with the pro-arbitration policy and also enables the Court to give permission to alter the Section 34 application if the facts of the case support it and it is necessary in the interest of justice[8]. Personal Opinion: As a student of law, I felt that this judgement was quite empowering – it removed a procedural/technical barrier and made space for accommodation in an effort to emancipate justice in its true sense. Consequently, parties now have a chance to raise an additional ground even in the later stage and the court will be pleased to hear the argument in pursuance of the principles of natural justice. References: [1] 2009 (4) MPJR-CG 115. [2] ‘Arbitration - Party Not Barred From Raising New Grounds To Set Aside Award In An Sec 37 Appeal: Supreme Court’ (Live Law, 8th November, 2021). [3] 2021 SCC Online SC 695. [4] [2010] 4 SCC 518. [5] [2018] 16 SCC 758. [6] [2019] 15 SCC 131. [7] Supra footnote 3. [8] Aravind Prakash, ‘Party Can Raise New Grounds Pertaining to Patent illegality In Arbitration Appeal To Set Aside An Arbitral Award: Supreme Court’ (LJRV Voice 20 November, 2021).

Case Commentary By: Poonam Mavi Research Intern, Legal WIND Name of the case: Xxxxx v. Xxxxx Citation: [2021] SCC Online ker 3458 Date of judgement: 14th September, 2021 Bench: Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Kauser Edappagath Court: The High Court of Kerela Facts of the case: The husband (petitioner) of the first respondent (wife) has filed for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, desertion and adultery and for recovery of money and gold ornament. The main allegation of the petitioner is that the first respondent has been living adulterous life with the second respondent (brother-in-law of petitioner’s wife) and the child born to the first respondent is that of the second respondent. Notably, The marriage was solemnised on July 5, 2006, and the first respondent's child was born on September 3, 2007. The petitioner was serving in the military at the time of the marriage. The petitioner claimed that after 22 days of marriage, he went for his work in Ladakh, and that there was no physical interaction between them during those 22 days or subsequently owing to the first respondent's refusal to cooperate. The petitioner's specific issue was that he was suffering from infertility. To prove infidelity and adulterous act on the part of the first respondent, the petitioner filed IA No.1570/2019 to conduct DNA test of the first respondent's son as also himself as the petitioner had made a particular claim that he was infertile and unable to have a child. The request was denied by the Court on the grounds that the child was an essential party to the petition and that its paternity and legitimacy could not be proved without the child on the party list[i]. Contention by the Petitioner: 1.The learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that without the DNA test, the petitioner spouse would be unable to prove and substantiate the claims he made in his pleadings, and that the court below should have ordered the DNA test. 2.The petitioner has also shown a solid prima facie case for raising a presumption against legitimacy i.e., a certificate provided by an infertility expert, according to which the petitioner is diagnosed with oligoasthenoteratospermia. Contention by the Respondent: 1.Using Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, the learned counsel for the wife contended that once the validity of marriage is established, there is a strong presumption of the legitimacy of children produced from that union, which can only be rebutted by strong and compelling evidence. 2. The counsel argued that even proof of the wife's infidelity is insufficient to dispel this presumption and will not justify a determination of illegitimacy if the husband has had access. The only method to overcome the conclusive presumption imposed by Section 112 of the Evidence Act is for the husband and wife to have no contact, and hence the request for a DNA test cannot be granted in the absence of compelling prima facie proof of non-access. 3. The counsel added that no one can be forced to furnish a blood sample for analysis. The issue which arose out of the case: Can DNA test be conducted to determine legitimacy of a child in a divorce petition without the child being on the party array? The court emphasised that there are two factors for evaluating whether a party is a required party to the proceedings: 1. Such a party must be entitled to some form of relief in relation to the topic at hand in the proceedings; 2. It should not be feasible to pass a valid decree in the absence of such a party. Hence, the court opined that the initial petition was not for a declaration of a person's legitimacy under S.7(1) r/w Explanation (e) of the Family Courts Act. The petition solely seeks to dissolve the marriage under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The presence of a child has no influence on whether or not a petition for dissolution of marriage is granted on the merits. The child's illegitimacy or paternity is only tangentially related to the petition for dissolution of marriage based on adultery or infidelity. The presence of the child is not required to determine the remedy sought. Judgment The court opined that in Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy[ii], The Supreme Court ruled that DNA testing is the most authentic and scientifically flawless method for proving the husband's allegations of adultery. This should be considered as the most legitimate, rightful, and correct way for the woman to refute the assertions made by the respondent-husband and prove that she had not been unfaithful, adulterous, or disloyal. If the appellant-wife is correct, she will be shown to be correct." Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik[iii], The court decided that the result of a real DNA test is scientifically accurate, and that when there is a disagreement between a legally required conclusive proof and a proof based on scientific advances that is widely acknowledged as right, the latter must succeed. According to a certificate provided by an infertility expert, the petitioner is diagnosed with oligoasthenoteratospermia. Low sperm count, sperm motility, and poor sperm morphology are all symptoms of this illness. Male infertility is caused by this most prevalent reason. The petitioner has no chance of having the child, according to the doctor. As a result of the supreme court's observations and the evidences provided by the Petitioner, the court opined that when a husband seeks dissolution of marriage alleging adultery or infidelity on the part of the wife and disputing the paternity of the child born during the marriage's duration, the court can order DNA testing to establish his assertion of infidelity or adultery without explicitly disturbing the presumption contemplated under section 112 of the Evidence Act with regard to the legitimacy of the child if a strong prima facie case is made out. Case analysis: In a ruling, the Supreme Court stated that if there is no proof of adultery, no DNA test should be performed. The court went on to say that there must be some primary evidence to substantiate the adultery claim before the court may order the scientific evidence of DNA testing to be used as secondary evidence[iv]. Here in this case, the petitioner has submitted the medical certificate that he had "oligoasthenoteratospermi," a disorder characterised by low sperm count, poor sperm motility, and aberrant sperm morphology, and is the most prevalent cause of male infertility. Corroboration was provided by a doctor who testified that the petitioner (husband) had no chance of having the child. It was also observed that the woman had failed to comply with the directive when the Family Court in Nedumangad ordered a DNA test on the husband's request during the wife's petition seeking maintenance for the child. As a result, the court deemed the primary evidence to be sufficient to issue an order for DNA testing of both the child and the Petitioner. Despite the fact that the court may have deemed the reasons to require Child's DNA testing to be valid. However, when viewed through the opposite lens, it is evident that the child's fundamental right to privacy and personal liberty has been violated. Conclusion The court gave the petitioner permission to conduct DNA tests on him and the first respondent's child based on the petitioner's strong primary evidence of infidelity and adultery, which made the order of DNA testing necessary to reach a reasonable conclusion. The court ordered that the DNA samples of the child and the petitioner shall be obtained by the laboratory in the presence of the petitioner and the first respondent. References: [i] [2021] SCC Online ker 3458 [ii][2014] SC AIR 418, [2014] AC 9744 [iii][2014] 2 SCC 576, [2014] CAC 24 [iv] Times of India, No DNA test if there is no proof of adultery: Supreme Court, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-dna-test-if-there-is-no-proof-of-adultery-supreme-court/articleshow/85021297.cms (Accessed on 16 November 2021)

The Right to Refund and Section 74(5) Of The CGST Act Authored By: Akul Mishra Research Intern, Legal WIND Date of Judgement: 14th September 2021 Bench: Hon’ble Justice S. Sunil Dutt Yadav Court: High Court of Karnataka Citation: WP 4467/2021 Introduction: The case judgment by the Hon’ble Karnataka HC has differentiated between the Right To Refund and process of investigation in the factual case context and has held that the two cannot be linked together and has additionally held that goodwill donation of money by companies cannot be held as tax. The Karnataka HC also directed the department to consider a refund application for the petitioner which was collected under coercion during the investigation. The question of coercion and the lack of proper evidence in the investigation by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) have been addressed in this case. Facts of the Case: The facts of the case from the petitioner’s point of view and submission are stated that the petitioner represents an E-commerce platform under the name Swiggy which is registered under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner has stated the use of third-party service providers during busy seasons and the consideration charged by the third-party providers includes the Goods and Services Tax (G.S.T.) and the petitioner has paid the GST which is availed as Input Tax Credit of the same. It is further submitted that an investigation had been initiated by the DGGI, Hyderabad Zonal Unit concerning third service providers who had been identified as ‘Greenfinch’. It was thereby held by the department that Greenfinch was a non-existent third party and thus, the Input Tax Credit availed by payment of G.S.T. to the third party was fraudulent. The petitioner continued to state that the statement of directors and employees was taken in two offices at Hyderabad and Delhi respectively. It was further specifically asserted that on 29.11.2019, the petitioner was forced to make a payment of ₹15 crores after a threat over the arrest of the company directors, and the same was paid on the next day at 4:00 A.M. the next day. The petitioner has further stated that the directors had responded to summons dated 26.12.2019 at the DGGI office, Hyderabad but they were held in force even after 20:00 hours and threats of arrest had been made. The petitioner had to make a payment of Rs. 12,51,44,157/- as a bond for the release of the directors. In conclusion, the petitioner was coerced in paying Rs. 27,51,44,157/- under illegal methods without following the due process of law under the CGST act. The no cause issued by the department even after 10 months of the investigation, constrained the seek of refund. The petitioner has also made a formal refund application under the Jurisdictional GST Office, dated 16.12.2020. Key Issues raised: 1) Whether the claim of fraudulent Input Tax Credit as claimed by the department was correctly identified. 2) Whether the payments made are under due process of law under the CGST Act, 2017 and not illegal. 3) The contention of refund as claimed by the petitioner is acceptable under the factual context. ARGUMENTS RAISED: Contentions by Respondent: 1.The respondent has objected by stating that ‘Greenfinch’ does not exist and the suppliers are non-existent and the summons were initiated based on this basis of investigation. The petitioner had availed wrongful Input Tax Credits without actual receipts of services. 2.It has defended the inconclusive progress of the investigation due to the hampers of the pandemic and the huge encompassing of the country due to the petitioner’s irregularities has been a factor. It has vehemently denied any coercion and has stated that the powers of investigation have been dutifully followed and has asserted that there is a lack of evidence to substantiate the petitioners claim of involuntary payment and has asserted that the letter from the petitioner dated 30.11.2019 was in contrary to claim of involuntary payment and coercion. 3.The respondent continued to point out the non-existence of ‘Greenfinch’ and has submitted various offences committed by both parties under Section 132(5) of CGST Act, 2017. It has also been stated that the payments as per the communication were taken as a goodwill gesture and the payments are termed as payment of tax in self-ascertainment under Section 74(5) of the CGST Act. 4.The question of coercion and locking of premises was done within the rules, for the safety of the petitioners, and access to legal and other professionals had been done in due course of the investigation. The officers had no orders for arrest other than the due process of investigation and there were unfair apprehensions claimed by the petitioner and no such coercion occurred. 5.In light of the refund application made by the petitioner, the petitioner has exercised its statutory right and invoked the schemes available under the statutory part of the act and the action of submitting a writ petition is impermissible. Contentions raised by the Respondent: 1.The claim of coercion and duress has been admitted through facts that can also be made out from the respondent and contention raised in such should not be decided in the process of rejecting the writ application. There is only one dispute related to the investigation period between 28.11.2019 and 30.11.2019 where the petitioner has made a deposit that had been confirmed through the money credited to the Electronic Cash Ledger. The letter of intimation of payment concerning the Rs.15 crore payment was made without the words ‘with protest’ due to an object from the department. The letter of intimation with the protest was sent finally on 30.11.2019 to the DGGI. 2. The investigation between 26.12.2019 and 27.12.2019 had involved a forceful stay of the directors in the summons office till early morning on the 27th, and a transaction of Rs 12,51,44,157/- was deposited in the electronic cash ledger, and the directors were forced to file a DRC-03[1] and the process concluded in the early morning on the 27th. A letter detailing the payments was sent including the statements of the Directors was recorded. 3. In the relevant period for which the investigation had commenced, the petitioner was filing GST returns and paying tax regularly. The petitioner as a regular tax-payer stated that there was an unfair manner of the investigation proceedings and it is ready to comply with lawful demand and the adjudication till the end of the investigation. 4. The payments were termed as ones under protest which could be obtained from the communications made to the department after the payment had been made. 5. As a no-show cause notice had been sent, the payments had remained with the department. As the investigation is prolonged and inconclusive, the petitioner has the right to seek a refund of tax which would not remove their obligation to serve the demands made after adjudication. CASE ANALYSIS: The court has noticed that the application submitted by the petitioner has been the statutory remedy but the way of communication by the department has merely deduced the claim for refund as premature, as the same in the course of an investigation. In the case of Godavari Sugar Mills v/s State of Maharashtra[2] can infer a legal deduction that if an amount is wrongfully withheld with substantial proof, the writ jurisdiction can act upon the refund claim by the petitioner as the prolonged investigation will not meet the retention of the claimed amount. The fact that a refund application has been made does not take away the proceedings for the present case when the final direction is for the consideration for the refund application and the remedy of refund will not displace current proceedings which is a ground for dismissal. The procedure under the scheme in subsection 5 of section 74, CGST Act is formed on conclusions based on subsections 6, 7, 8. The payment of tax, in this case, cannot be considered as self-ascertainment under the procedure of section 74(5) of the CGST act. The letter of the petitioner on 30.11.2019 is clear and is asserted that the contention of refund is not a liability admission. The contention that the payment was made of self-ascertainment was only put forward as a defense against the petitioner's claim of involuntary payment and is hence rejected. The affidavit submitted by the respondents does admit locking of doors and thus the apprehensions by the petitioners are reasonable especially with a lack of communication on there is no power on officers to make arrests and how the investigation was committed. The petitioner has submitted enough evidence to show taxes were paid throughout and when the money was deposited at the cash ledger. The summoning investigation itself can confirm that amounts were paid where there was no obligation. How the investigation occurred and the facts it is evident that the payment was not voluntary as a matter of haste by the department to ensure that taxes would be paid on the periods by which the claim of non-availment of ITC has been claimed, instead of carrying out with the investigation. The court refers to the case of D.K.Basu v/s State of West Bengal[3] and considered the fact that a taxpayer will have their rights enshrined under Article 21 which cannot be blocked on the fact that there is no interference in investigation proceedings. The precedent mentioned in the case of Paramvir Singh Saini v/s Baljit Singh[4] and others where it was held and instructed for the installation of CCTV cameras in national investigation offices, which involves the scope of video recording under CCTV cameras and can be brought out in legal proceedings at an appropriate stage. The court has also stated that it would not put pressure or any burden on the investigation and the department is allowed to conduct and complete the investigation at its discretion. The court also would not question the constitutional validity of section 16 (2) (c) of the Act as claimed by the respondent. to avoid the redressal of the petition. The court has held that “the consideration of the right to refund in the present factual matrix would be independent of the process of investigation and the two cannot be linked together”. Judgment: The court has accordingly held that refund applications will be considered and suitable orders will be passed within four weeks from the date of the order. The observations of the court will be the basis of the refund application and hence, the writ petition is disposed of and has been signed by the judge. REFERENCES: 1)Bimal Jain , “Karnataka HC : Swiggy’s payment made during investigation is not considered as ascertained tax, refund of same is allowed” CaClubIndia , 24th October 2021. 2)Vinay Kumar and Sachin Mishra, “Unreported Decisions-ST-November 2021” The Chamber Of Tax Consultants, November 2021. 3)Reportable, Karnataka HC writ petition 4467 of 2021 (https://ctconline.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2021/seminar-presentation/unreported-decisions/Bundl-HC-Order-Nov-2021.pdf) pg 4-48. [1] A voluntary tax payment form [2] (2011) 2 SCC 439 [3] (1997) 1 SCC 416 [4] (2021) 1 SCC 184

Case Analysis By: Vivek Jain Research Intern, Legal WIND Citation: Civil Appeal No. 6238 Of 2021 Date of Judgement: October 06, 2021 Bench: Hon'ble Justice Ms. Banerjee, Justice J.K. Maheshwari Court: Supreme Court of India Introduction:- The case of Union of India v. Methu Meda was presented before the Supreme Court of India. This case discusses whether acquittal from charges of kidnapping is an honorable acquittal or benefit of the doubt is given to the victim. In the mentioned case, Methu Meda, the respondent, was charged with the kidnapping of a civilian but was later acquitted of the charges as the victim turned hostile in the courtroom. After that, the respondent got selected by the CISF for the post of constable but later got refused because of the previous case. The question before the court is whether the refusal of his post by the screening committee because of acquittal stands valid or is been interfered with. The following words talk about the facts, arguments, and judgment of the case, and include a brief explanation and concepts related to the case. Facts: - 1. Methu Meda, the respondent, was tried before the session court of Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh. This concerned the kidnapping of Nilesh, a civilian. He was charged under Sections 347/327/323/506 (Part II) and 364A of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent was found to be involved in his kidnapping. He was soon acquitted of his charges as the victim turned hostile in the courtroom. 2. Afterwards, he applied and got selected for the post of constable in the CISF (Central Industrial Security force). Later at the time of the background check, the above case led to his disqualification from the post. A screening committee at CISF headquarters decided the respondent was not eligible for the post according to the guidelines mentioned in the CISF Circular No. EEG7023/TRG. SEC/ADM. I/CIRCULARS/2010­1157. 3. Upset by the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the high court of Indore, Madhya Pradesh. The Single Bench judge held the decision in favor of Methu Meda and directed the department to provide him with the position and all the job benefits except for the back wages. 4. CISF filed an appeal on this case in the divisional court, which was dismissed. Which led to the filing of the present appeal by the union. Issues raised: - 1.Whether the decision of the Screening Committee rejecting the candidature of the respondent, when there was no allegation of malice against the Screening Committee and the respondent writ petitioner had been acquitted of serious charges of kidnapping for ransom as some prosecution witnesses had turned hostile, ought to have been interfered with? Arguments advanced: - Petitioner A. That merely disclosing the criminal case in the attestation form is not enough for selection. B. The respondent was charged for heinous offenses like offenses under section 327/347/364A of IPC. The respondent shall not be entitled until being honorably acquitted. C. Provisional selection does not amount to final recruitment. Mere acquittal giving the benefit of the doubt as the witnesses have turned hostile would not make the candidate suitable for appointment. Respondent A. That the situation and background of the candidates hailing from the rural areas were relevant for consideration. B. That mere registration of a criminal case and acquittal from the charges would not die entitle the candidate for appointment. C. The respondent has concealed no facts or specific details regarding the criminal case. It would not dis entitle him from appointment to the post. Explanation: - The case is related to the appointment of the petitioner for a post in the police force. The main issue here is the petitioner before the application was charged for the case of kidnapping. He was charged under heinous offenses but got acquittal from the charges after the witnesses turned hostile in the courtroom. The main issue arrived here is to decide whether the acquittal be considered as ‘honorable acquittal’ be given in benefit of the doubt. For this, it is important to understand the concept of acquittal, honorable acquittal, the acquittal of blame, and fully acquitted. This term is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Indian Penal Code. These are developed with time by judicial pronouncements. The Expression “honorably acquitted” is unknown to courts of justice. It is mainly used in tribunals and court-martials. The term simply means that the accused is acquitted as completely as he can be acquitted. If the acquittal is directed by the court on a consideration of facts and material evidence on record with the finding of false implication or the finding that the guilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of the accused as just, it is treated as an honorable acquittal. This was observed with Robert Stuart Wauchope vs. Emperor 61 ILR Cal. 168(1934). There are multiple instances where mere acquittal did not amount to Honorable acquittal. In case the prosecution failed to take the steps to examine essential witnesses or the witnesses turned hostile, the acquittal would fall under the preview of giving the benefit of the doubt. Here, the accused cannot be treated as honorably acquitted. In Reserve Bank of India vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal 1 SCC 541 (1994) on an organizational level, guilt may be proven based on personal profoundness and probability. The nature of acquittal is necessary, the relevant factors and the nature of the offense, the extent of his involvement, the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activity in the future, are the relevant aspects for consideration by the Screening Committee, which is competent to decide all these issues. The employer may consider the suitability of the candidate as per government orders, instructions, or rules at the time of deciding to appoint the candidate for employment. Acquittal on the technical ground regarding the offenses of heinous nature, which is not a clean acquittal, the employer has a right to consider all relevant facts available as to the descendants and may take an appropriate decision as to the further deployment of the employee. As said in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR 18798 (2017). Even in the case, a truthful declaration about the proceeding trial has been made by the applicant, still, the employer may consider descendants and cannot be forced to appoint the candidate. Observations by the court: - The Bench considered the facts of the present case where the instructions of the home department prevailed at the time of selection and appointment. Where it is specified that the candidates similar to the case would not be considered for recruitment. If a candidate is found involved in any criminal case, whether it is completed or pending, the candidate may not be allowed to join without further instructions from the headquarter. It is prevalent that a person who wishes to join the disciplinary force, like crime investigation forces in the current instance, must be a person of utmost rectitude and have impeccable character and integrity with no possibility of doubt. If a person has a past of being accused of being involved in criminal activities and having nuclear dismissal, the person may be unfit for the post. This may allow the screening committee to disqualify the candidate unless there is any malefaction in the decision. If acquittal from grievous charges is given based on misconduct by the other party, there is a high probability that the acquittal is given in benefit of the doubt and it stays unclear whether or not the accused has done the offense. This should not lead to the risk of public safety and integrity of the disciplinary forces. Judgment: - The court in the above case held that, if a person is acquitted under the impression of the benefit of the doubt, from the charge of a highly grievous offense or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined forces. The employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms of circulars issued by the screening committee. Only the mere disclosure of the offenses alleged, and the result of the trial, is not sufficient for final selection. In the said situation, the employer cannot may give an appointment to the candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court have not considered the above legal provisions, as discussed in the orders impugned. Regarding this, the court quashed the impugned orders passed by the high court and the division bench. The respondent was deemed not entitled to the position of constable and the salary and other benefits involved. This appeal was allowed, and the impugned orders were set aside. There was no judgment who will pay for proceedings for the petitioner. Cases cited:- 1. Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration, and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr. 1 SCC 797(2018) 2. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another vs. Mehar Singh 7 SCC 685(2013) 3. Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others 8 SCC 471(2016) 4. Chandigarh Administration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr. 1 SCC 797 (2018) 5. Reserve Bank of India vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal 1 SCC 541(1994) 6. R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India SC 787(AIR 1964) 7. Major Robert Stuart Wauchope vs Emperor Cal 800 (AIR 1933) 8. State of Assam & Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari, 7 SLR 44(1972) 9. Panna Mehta vs. State of M.P. 4 M.P.H.T. 226(2002) 10.Rahul Yadav vs CISF and another, 178DLT 263(2011) 11. Inspector-General of Police & Another vs. S. Samuthiram 1 SCC 598(2013)

Case Analysis By: Vivek Jain Research Intern, Legal WIND Citation: Criminal Appeal No(S). 1206 of 2021 Date of Judgement: October 08, 2021 Bench: Justice Ajay Rastogi, Justice Abhay S. Oka Court: Supreme Court of India Introduction: The following is a commentary on the case of Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya and others. vs M/S. Gharrkul Industries Pvt. which is being presented before the Supreme Court. This case deals with sections 138 and 141 of the negotiable instruments act. The appellants have filed an appeal under section 482 CrPC, requesting relief from the decisions made by the Honorable High Court under that provision. The Supreme Court has to decide whether the issue of cheques by defaulting company that was dishonored by the bank applies any vicarious liability on the directors over the general managers of that particular company who are the appellants in the present case. Facts of the Case: 1. Back in 2007 when ASHUTOSH ASHOK PARASRAMPURIYA(appellant) and his other colleagues requested Gharkul Industries Private Ltd (respondent) for financial assistance as their business under the name Ameya Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. was suffering and needed financial assistance to survive. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the respondents and the second appellant Dilip Shrikrishna Andhare with the consent of all other appellants. 2. A total amount of Rs. 1,50,19,831 was received by the appellants through cheque during the period, dated 23rd November 2007 to 12th March 2009. The borrowers committed to pay back the borrowed funds in one or two years. Later, the responder wanted to view the company's balance statement. He made it plain that all of the appellants are the company's directors and, as such, are accountable for the company's operations. The appellant-Company on 2nd June 2012 issued a cheque in favor of the respondent of the value Rs. 10,00,000/- which was later dishonored by the bank due to lack of funds. The respondent issued a notice in the name of the appellant demanding the said amount which was duly declined by them according to the post office authorities. 3. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellants under section 138 of the Negotiation Instruments Act, 1881,when the notice was not claimed. The trial court made the decision in favor of the respondents. This judgment was then contested by the appellants in two separate criminal petitions filed under section 482 of the Criminal Code. Seeking to have the criminal allegations filed against them, as well as the, summon orders of November 10, 2012, it has been quashed. Arguments: By Appellants That no explicit official decision has been made that they have committed the violation and are liable for the company's business operations. They cannot be held vicariously accountable and charged in the proceedings just because they are directors of the corporation. The appellants alleged that there was never a notice relating to the dishonour of the cheque, and there's no indication of their being the company's managing directors on the date the check was written. Appellants were the non-executive directors of the company and therefore they are not responsible for any conduct of the business. The order passed by the trial judge was not according to the law. By Respondents The council for the respondents alleged that appellants have claimed that they are non-executive directors but according to form number 32 obtained by the registrar of companies, they are directors of the company and are responsible for the conduct of business activities involved in the company, furthermore, there is nothing to prove that they are appointed as non-executive directors. It was further revealed that, in addition to the dishonored cheque in the immediate case, additional cheque were also dishonored over the course of the proceedings, and the respondent filed separate complaints about them. Explanation: The above-mentioned case is related to the essentials of section 138 and section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. As mentioned by the appellant council, at the time of issue of the cheque, the appellants were considered non-executive directors of the company. To make the appellants responsible for the acts done that are the issuance of the cheque, they must be able to show that they are in command of the firm at the time the check is written. Section 141 further states that the person may be discharged from his liability if he is successful in proving that he has performed all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offense. When any offenses committed by the company (in the above case, an offense under section 138 is committed) the in-charge of the company that may be either director, manager, secretary, or any other official, shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offense and shall be punished accordingly. In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, the court has discussed the essential elements to apply section 141, the first element, the person accused was in charge of the business or was responsible for the conduct of the business. secondly only being a director in a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under the section, the specific requirement of section 141 is that the person should at least be responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time when the event took place. The appellants, in this case, are deemed to be executive directors of the company as it was proven by the registrar of companies. Also, the borrowed money was taken in the first place to save the business by the appellants themselves. This makes it clear that they were responsible for the conduct of the business. Now the question arises “whether they were responsible for issuing cheques that got dishonored due to insufficient funds or not”. Here, the concept of vicarious liability comes into play. The appellants being directors were non-signatory, the court must decide whether they were vicariously liable for issuance of cheques in bad faith by the defaulting company. The honorable Court has relied upon the case of SMS Pharmaceuticals Limited(supra). The court first reviewed a magistrate's duty when issuing a process and his ability to dismiss a complaint under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court was surprised to learn that a complaint must include all of the information needed for the magistrate to decide whether or not to issue the procedure. The court also discussed the requirements to aver in a complaint under section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument act. Without this averment, the requirements of section 141 cannot be fulfilled. Concerning the liability of the executive directors for the conduct of the business, if they are responsible, then it will be covered under section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and the High Court may not have the authority to grant them relief under section 482 CrPC. Making directors stand trial will be against the law unless it is established that they were not involved in the issue of cheques. The court is primarily concerned with the directors who are not signatories to the checks in this case. The allegations in the present case mentioned that when the cheques were issued by the company and dishonored by the bank, then the appellants were the directors of the company and responsible for its business all the parents were involved in the business of the company. It is not conceivable that a cheque of such a high value is signed without the permission or consent of any one of the directors and even so after the cheques were issued in ‘dishonored notice’ for payment was sent to the company’s address as well as the personal address of the signatories of the memorandum of understanding, was declined by them as per the post office authorities. In the given circumstances. The court has said unequivocally that it will overrule the arguments of the skilled counsel for the appellants. Further Proceedings: Since other cases instituted by the respondents have been held up before the trial court, and these are the old cases instituted in 2012, the court has issued an interim order and a further hearing will be conducted on November 22, 2021. References: 1. Legislative Department, Negotiation Instruments Act 1881, A1881-26. 2. Legislative Department, The Code Of Criminal Procedure 1973, A1974-02. 3. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005).8 SCC 89 4. Prachi Bhardwaj, ‘Explained| Sections 138 and 141 of NI Act: Vicarious liability of directors of a company for dishonour of cheques’(2021) SCC ONLINE.

Karnataka High Court calls person committing suicide a ‘Weakling’! Do not diminish the gravity of mental health issues, says Apex Court. Case Analysis By: Vaishnavi Research Intern, Legal WIND Citation: 2021 SCC online SC 1021[Criminal Appeal No. 1239 of 2021] Date of Judgement: October 29, 2021 Division Bench: Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna Court: Supreme Court of India Introduction: Karnataka High Court has termed the person who committing suicide a ‘weakling’. Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna opined that, “The mental health of a person cannot be compressed into a one size fits all approach” while setting the order of Karnataka high court which quashed criminal proceedings against a government official in a case of abetment of suicide. Further it added that there is no material to corroborate the allegations made in the suicide note is mistaken. Facts: On December 6, 2016 an FIR was registered at Maddur police station at 20:00 hours by Mahendra KC, brother of deceased under section 306 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the Special Land Acquisition Officer for Bengaluru city and another driver of his car. Deceased, who was working as driver of government officer (Special Land Acquisition Officer), who used to travel from Bengaluru once in a month to visit the family where deceased used to drive for him, was found dead on 6th December 2016, suicide note was found next to him which was running twelve pages and the same was uploaded on his Facebook account by him. His suicide note establishes that, accused accumulated wealth of approximately hundred crores which is illegally gotten and converted black into white and transferred the funds to relatives. The complaint asserted that the accused had threatened the deceased and harassed him which resulted in mental stress and pushed the deceased to death by poison consumption. The second respondent and his driver were named and held responsible for the suicide. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) was in arrested on 11 December 2016 with reference to the complaint made by BT Suresh (deceased friend), an FIR was registered on 12th December 2016 under the sections 323, 324, 341, 342, 363, 506, 144 read with section 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. On April 18, 2017 the SLAO instituted a petition under section 482 CrPC for quashing the FIR registered against him. The bench of single judge of Karnataka High Court on 29 May 2020 quashed the proceedings relating to the complaint and the FIR on the ground that the prolongation of the prosecution would be a “travesty of justice and be a sheer waste of time, besides requiring the accused-respondent to undergo the rigors of a lengthy trial”. Resentful, the State of Karnataka and the complainant (brother of deceased) had approached the hon’ble supreme court of India. Key contentions/Issue raised: High court while exercising power under section 482 CrPC[1] to quash FIR against SLAO should have interrogated mentioned questions: 1. Whether the allegation made in the complaint, prima facie constitutes an offence? 2. Whether the allegations are so improbable that a cautious man would not arrive at the conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint? Arguments: 1. Arguments presented by the appellant: According to Advocate Mahesh Thakur the matter was at the phase of investigation and the officer was on bail, the single judge bench had quashed the FIR as a result the entire investigation was stopped midway. The counsel further mentioned that the high court had completely failed to recognize the seriousness and gravity of the allegations made against the accused. To substantiate contention counsel also argued that besides the suicide note, the deceased had informed both the complainant and other witnesses of the harassment which had a position of influence and with whom the deceased worked as a driver. 2. Arguments presented by the respondent: Bench of singe judge of Karnataka high court held that, accused did not deprived him from wealth or threatened the deceased. If the deceased genuinely felt imperial he would have straight away appeared to police station. High court observed that the deceased took significant time to pen down twelve pages, “it would have been but natural for the author to set out the details”. And made withstanding remark on the suicide note itself, degrading the importance of mental health. Advocate V N Raghupathy appearing for the state submitted that the investigation was stopped since the suicide note was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis but the high court while addressing the proceedings under section 482 restrained the proceedings. They are of opinion that allegation in the complaint and in suicide note fell short of the ingredients to establish a case of abetment and hence the essential requirements of the offence under section 306 had not been addressed and established. Judgement: The judgement held that this is not the of case the deceased (driver) that the accused had deprived him of his property or exhausted his hopes towards life or departed from kith and kins. There is no trace of the prosecution that the deceased was escaping from petitioner or his subordinate. If deceased has firmly felt threatened, he would have lodged complaint. It is not that deceased was weakling, he was driver by profession and accidents and life goes hand in hand. By observing his activity like attending a relative’s functions and interacting an indication of behavior of a normal person and not person undergoing harsh treatment. The contention that this criminal case would jeopardize his career progression also cannot be brushed aside. The bench concluded by describing the manner in which a depressed person ought to have behaved deeply diminishes the gravity of mental health. Precedent Mentioned (Case laws): · State of Orissa v Saroj Kumar Sahoo[2] · State of Haryana v Ch. Bhajan Lal[3] · State of M P v Surendra Kori[4] Case Analysis: The apex court noticed that the High Court has exceeded limits of the power under section 482 CrPC and a criminal trial or an appeal against a conviction on a charge under section 306 of IPC.[5] Essentially, the work of high court was to determine whether the allegations made in FIR are taken at their face value, genuine and accepted in their entirely did or did not prima facie constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. The high court has taken it beyond its capacity and derived its own perspective of the allegations. Instead, was supposed to apply the settled principles. The bench further added that, “Behavioral scientists have initiated the discourse on the heterogeneity of every individual and have challenged the traditional notion of ‘all humans behave alike’. Individual personality differences manifest as a variation in the behavior of people. Therefore, how an individual copes up with a threat both physical and emotional, expressing love, loss, sorrow and happiness, varies greatly in view of the multifaceted nature of the human mind and emotions. Thus, the observation describing the manner in which a depressed person ought to have behaved deeply diminishes the gravity of mental health issues”. Furthermore, “The high court stalled the investigation by granting an interim order of stay. If the investigation had been taken forward then, there would have been disclosed of material facts which would helped into the trial, for the alleged offence against the second respondent”. In annexation, bench noticed that the Karnataka high court has failed to complete the investigation in the complaint pending on the file of the second additional civil judge (junior division) and JMFC court, Maddur, Mandya district. High court stalled the investigation by granting interim order of stay. “The judgement is replete with hypothesis and surmises on the basis of which the single judge has reached an inference on facts. The single judge has tested the veracity of the allegations in criminal complaint and in the suicide note left behind of an evidentiary record which would be collected during the trial. At the stage when High court consider a petition for quashing under section 482 of the CrPC, the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the high court test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of trail.” Conclusion: The suicide annotation includes the complete the involvement of accused in the events which led deceased to lose his life and what matters is the investigation and fair trial to serve the justice. According to the hon’ble supreme court, each and every individual go through or can say experience the depression of mental health differently, it is very uneven to term it as ‘weakling’ and the observation is legitimate to break the notion associated with mental health that, strong people aren’t depressed and they do not have mental health issues. The Indian legal system is finally taking the initiative to spread the importance of mental health, last November Madras high court showcased lacuna of government spending on mental health infrastructure. It noted the 'need of the hour’ to have sufficient psychiatrists and departments at each level. References/Bibliography: 1.Mahendra K C v State of Karnataka, 2021 Latest Caselaw 545SC: (Accessed 10 November 2021) 2.Bhardwaj Prachi, “Karnataka HC calls person committing suicide a ‘weakling’! Don’t diminish the gravity of mental health issues, says SC” (Accessed 10 November 2021) 3. Press Trust of India, “Mental health of person cannot be compressed into ‘one size fits’ all approach: SC”https://www.indiatoday.in/amp/law/story/mental-health-of-person-cannot-be-compressed-into-one-size-fits-all-approach-sc-1874060-2021-11-07 (Accessed 10 November 2021) [1] Nothing shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of high court to make orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. [2] 2003 CRILJ 1872 [3] 1992 AIR 604 [4] WP No. 2431/2010 [5] If a person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.