Authored By: S Ashwath
Citation: [2021] 3 SCC 731
Date Of Judgement: 1st February 2021
Bench: CJI N.V. Ramana, Justice Surya Kant
Court: Supreme Court Of India
INTRODUCTION
Social evil practices or actions have always existed in society, dating back to the dawn of time. The innocent are often the ones who suffer the most. Given the fact that terrorism exists in the globe and the need to combat it, India has enacted a number of laws. Some have since been repealed, while others remain in place. The Unlawful Acts (Prevention) Act 1967 is the focus of this article. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb is being hailed as a victory for numerous defendants detained under the draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. This Instance shows that constitutional rights are not meant to be toyed with.
FACTS OF THE CASE[1]
The fact of the above case is that there was a radical organization called the popular font of India(PFI). K.A. Najeeb, the primary accused, is from this radical organization . The victim of the case is T.J Joseph. The respondent in this case considered a question posed by the victim offensive and believed that the question was purposefully aimed at a certain religion.
As a result, the respondent and other members of the organization prepared an attack on the victim to revenge their religious views. For a petty issue which involves an objectionable question, the victim got grievously injured. To make it worse the org, bombed the bystanders to avoid the aiding of victim. Hence, an FIR was filed and the NIA (National Investigation Agency) when found that there was involvement of dangerous weapons, they stated that UAPA should be applied to all the offenders involved. The accused was declared fugitive and the co-accused was given imprisonment for 6-8 years and the fugitive was in custody for 5 years. During his time in prison, the respondent sought for bail several times but was consistently denied by the NIA special court since there was prima facie evidence against him. Furthermore, he was ineligible for bail under Section 43D(5), and the standard bail conditions do not apply under UAPA. The respondent decided to ask for bail in the High Court after being frustrated by his NIA special court efforts.
The court overturned the NIA special court's decision and granted the respondent bail. The court felt the trial had been carrying on for far too long without reaching a decision. As a result, NIA filed an appeal, claiming that the court's bail decision was incorrect. As a result, this situation has come about.
ISSUES OF THE CASE
Is it possible for a violation of Article 21 to override the statutory rigours imposed by Section 43D(5) of the UAPA?
Is the court obligated to deny bail when the suspect is presumed guilty?
Is it possible to dispute the court's decision to grant bail without any particular grounds?
ARGUMENTS
⮚ Contentions by the Appellant
The first argument given by the appellant is that the bail granted to the respondent does not align with Section 43(D)(5) of the UAPA as it flawed. The other argument they stated was that the counsel emphasized that where the accused is prima facie guilty, the courts are obligated to deny bail. It was also argued in this instance that the fact that the respondent had been a fugitive for years made it clearer for the courts to deny bail. The last argument given by them were that in response to the trial's delay, the lawyers in this case claimed that NIA had filed an extra affidavit to interrogate 276 witnesses.
⮚ Contentions by the Respondent
The first argument given by this side was that the almost most of the co-accused have been either acquitted or convicted for less than 8 years. Following that the respondent stated that the respondent has already been imprisoned for more than 5 years, which is a constitutional violation under Part III of the Constitution's equal access to justice and right to a prompt trial provisions. Furthermore, the respondent's attorney made the position that if the High Court has granted bail to the accused, the Supreme Court should not intervene unless there are exceptional circumstances. Finally, the counsel pointed out that there is a violation of right to freedom and liberty by detaining the accused without any trial in the present case.
JUDGEMENT[2]
This case was led by N.V. Ramana with the support of Surya Kant. Before giving the verdict, the bench did careful research and made sure not to give a hasty decision. The Supreme Court confirmed the High Court's ruling, this is because the court was aiming to strike a balance between the appellant's ability to present any evidence it wants in order to prove the accusations beyond a reasonable doubt and the respondent's rights provided under Part III of the Constitution. As a result, the appellant's SLP was deemed unmaintainable. In other words, even though the accused has been found prima facie guilty by the NIA, the Supreme Court concluded that the accused is entitled to bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
However, courts can grant bail if the provisions of any legislation contradict the accused's constitutional rights, and in this case, the facts made it evident to the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the accused's 'right to a quick trial' had been breached. Furthermore, the fact that the trial is unlikely to be completed very soon. Furthermore, Section 43(d)(5) does not impose any restrictions on the accused's ability to conduct another offence, and it is simply another reason to reject bail. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and determined that the special leave petition was unmaintainable.
PRECEDENTS MENTIONED
1. Puran v. Rambilas[3] - It was reiterated that while determining on a bail application, reasons must be recorded, even if the evidence is not being evaluated on its merits.
2. Gurcharan Singh v. State[4] - This Court held that a trial court's grant of bail may only be revoked by the same court if new circumstances/evidence arose; otherwise, an appeal to a higher court with appellate jurisdiction would be required.
3. Shankar Raghuman Rohida v. State of Maharashtra[5] - When the accused had been in jail for a long time and there was little chance of a speedy trial, the court increased their bail. The legitimacy of strict bail conditions under such special legislation has thus been principally argued on the basis of expedited trials to safeguard innocent civilians.
4. Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India[6] - Undertrials cannot be held indefinitely until trial, the court said. In an ideal world, no one should incur negative consequences as a result of their actions unless they are proven in front of an impartial arbitrator.
5. National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali[7] - It was stressed that bail processes under the special enactment were separate, and that courts were required to deny release if the defendant was found to be guilty prima facie. It was also argued that the fact that the respondent had been missing for years made suspicions about his bail all the more valid.
CASE ANALYSIS
Seeing the facts and issue of the case, it is important to analyse the case properly as well. Before analysing it though, it is important to note what the court had to say on the issues of the case mentioned above. As for the first issue which is if it is possible for a violation of article 21 to override the statutory rigours imposed by Section 43D(5) of the UAPA? Well, Undertrials cannot be held indefinitely until trial, the court said. In an ideal world, no one should incur negative consequences as a result of their actions unless they are proven in front of an impartial arbitrator. To support the statement the court stated that the legislative policy against bail is expected to be respected by courts, but the rigours of such provisions will be tested if there is little chance of a speedy trial and the length of jail already served has exceeded a significant portion of the authorized sentence. This approach would prevent rules like Section 43D (5) of the UAPA from being utilised as the primary criterion for denial of bail or wholesale violations of the constitutional right to a speedy trial[8].
As for the next issue, Both the statute's restrictions and the powers promised to the Supreme Court under constitutional authority can be adequately reconciled, it was added. Despite the fact that the accused was prima facie guilty, the judges, while recognising the severity of the offences, took into account the time the respondent had spent in custody. The High Court's decision to grant bail was warranted, considering the "unlikelihood of the trial being finished anytime soon." The court observed, "An endeavor has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's ability to lead evidence of its choosing and establish the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, while also ensuring that the respondent's rights granted under Part III of our Constitution are effectively preserved." As for the last issue, both the statute's restrictions and the powers promised to the Supreme Court under constitutional authority can be adequately reconciled, it was added. Despite the fact that the accused was prima facie guilty, the judges, while recognizing the severity of the offences, took into account the time the respondent had spent in custody. The High Court's decision to grant bail was warranted, considering the "unlikelihood of the trial being finished anytime soon." The court observed, "An endeavor has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's ability to lead evidence of its choosing and establish the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, while also ensuring that the respondent's rights granted under Part III of our Constitution are effectively preserved. It's worth noting that Section 43(D)(5) of the UAPA is being closely scrutinized, as it grants the NIA special court unique authority to reject bail if it's judged appropriate.
What's important to note here is that neither the Act nor any judgement have defined the term "necessary." As a result, the investigating authorities may abuse this section. It can also be witnessed in the current case, where the accused was denied bail many times by the NIA special court before receiving it from the High Court." TADA (Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 1987) and POTA ( Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002) were severely condemned and subsequently repealed in the last thirty years for their strict and "anti-people" features. This, however, proved ineffective because the anti-terror laws that succeeded these older regulations had the same provisions verbatim, but with a broader scope of abuse. This scope is evident in the current case, as the threshold set forth in this section is significantly lower than that set forth in previous anti-terror statutes or 'regular' criminal law. UAPA was created with the declared goal of stopping individuals from acting in a way that was "prejudicial to state aims," and was quickly dubbed "advanced" POTA. In a complicated web of rules that must be scrutinised from every angle, UAPA's original goal was to relieve the criminal justice system's load during extraordinary circumstances. This was quickly replaced by a toy governed by the executive's whims. In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the abuse and application of extraordinary legislation. Draconian prohibitions justified in the name of the "exceptional" are rapidly becoming part of common law. As a result, the distinction between temporary provisions for unusual situations and laws under legislative review is becoming increasingly blurred.
The need for special legislation was argued on the grounds of ensuring "closer and faster delivery of justice" and lowering the conviction rate. The current situation, as is well known, runs counter to the spirit of 'exceptional' laws, and the rate of convictions has risen dramatically as a result of the Act's expanded reach. The conclusions of the Malimath Committee Report, which revealed a disturbing amount of 'exceptional' provisions being applied for ordinary offences in the name of 'simplifying the system,' were emphasized by a well-known author[9]. Various proposals have been made to amend the criminal code in order to allow for extraordinary provisions that frequently obliterate fundamental human rights. This not only goes beyond the theoretical scope of the laws, which should be limited to exceptional circumstances, but it also undermines the CrPC's current procedural laws. In actuality, the UAPA has gone beyond its own limits, as it is frequently used to suppress dissent and freedom of expression. The State has the authority under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA to deny bail whenever it deems it appropriate. The criterion for what is judged "essential" is so low that it is vulnerable to manipulation and power abuse by investigative agencies. It's also worth noting that, according to data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB)[10], just 2.2 percent of those arrested under the UAPA are convicted by the courts. As a result, holding the accused in custody for a prolonged period of time may appear to be questionable.
Longer custody, on the other hand, has an obvious link to fundamental rights. It was apparent in this case as well that the accused had violated his constitutional rights by imprisoning him for more than five years without being tried. It was also noted by the Supreme Court, and the accused was given bail as a result. At the 'interlocking of ordinary and special legislation,' the infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution, which safeguards individual liberty and the freedom to protest, is frequently neglected. In this scenario, the same thing has happened. Now the main problem that could be observed in Section 43D (5) of UAPA is that State prosecutors have frequently exploited Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and its harsh provisions as a weapon, making it nearly hard for anyone indicted under UAPA to obtain bail.
CONCLUSION
Reading this far, a hazy picture should have arisen about this case and why the case came about. There were a lot of subjective opinions, but this paper is not about which thoughts are right but to make the reader know the issue behind this case and how it can be analysed. The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 (UAPA) was created to assist the government in putting a stop to rising terrorist activity and relieving the criminal justice system of its burden. In light of such incidents, it is safe to conclude that, in addition to combating terrorist activities, UAPA has been infringing on individual constitutional rights, which cannot be taken away from citizens when the country is in an "emergency." Instead of feeling frightened, the government should strive to establish a balance between strict regulations and fundamental rights, so that citizens feel empowered rather than threatened.
REFERENCE
Union of India V. K.A. Najeeb [2021] SCC 731
Shivangi Banerjee, ‘Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb: A Trial Without a Trial’(lawoctopus 3 march 2021) <https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/case-uoi-v-najeeb/#_ednref10> accessed 21st December 2021
Ibid (1)
Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338
Gurcharan Singh v. State 1978 AIR 179
Shankar Raghuman Rohida v. State of Maharashtra 2003 (4) MhLj 520
Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731
NIA v. Zahoor (2019) 5 SCC 1
Abhishek Bhardwaj, “Anatomization of the Draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act” (2021) 2(3) <Anatomization-of-the-Draconian-Unlawful-Activities-Prevention-Act-by-Abhishek-Bhardwaj.pdf (burnishedlawjournal.in)> accessed 22nd December 2021
Ujjwal Kumar Singh. (2004). State and Emerging Interlocking Legal Systems: ‘Permanence of the Temporary’. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(2), 149-154. from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414494, p 3
Diganth Raj Sehgal, ‘The status of UAPA undertrials in the light of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb’ (blogipleaders 17 July 2021) <https://blog.ipleaders.in/status-uapa-undertrials-light-union-india-v-k-najeeb/#Opinion_of_the_Court> accessed 23rd December 2021
[1] Shivangi Banerjee, ‘Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb: A Trial Without a Trial’(lawoctopus 3 march 2021) <https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/case-uoi-v-najeeb/#_ednref10> accessed 21st December 2021 [2] Ibid (1) [3] Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 [4] Gurcharan Singh v. State 1978 AIR 179 [5] Shankar Raghuman Rohida v. State of Maharashtra 2003 (4) MhLj 520 [6]Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731 [7] NIA v. Zahoor (2019) 5 SCC 1 [8] Abhishek Bhardwaj, “Anatomization of the Draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act” (2021) 2(3) <Anatomization-of-the-Draconian-Unlawful-Activities-Prevention-Act-by-Abhishek-Bhardwaj.pdf (burnishedlawjournal.in)> accessed 22nd December 2021 [9] Ujjwal Kumar Singh. (2004). State and Emerging Interlocking Legal Systems: ‘Permanence of the Temporary’. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(2), 149-154. from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414494, p 3 [10] Diganth Raj Sehgal, ‘The status of UAPA undertrials in the light of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb’ (blogipleaders 17 July 2021) <https://blog.ipleaders.in/status-uapa-undertrials-light-union-india-v-k-najeeb/#Opinion_of_the_Court> accessed 23rd December 2021
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